Alzheimer's Victim May Have Had Capacity to Execute Deedslast
Alzheimer's Victim May Have Had Capacity to Execute DeedsLast Updated: 8/28/2005
Reversing lower courts, the Alabama Supreme Court rules that an elderly man's diagnosis of Alzheimer's disease and severe short-term memory loss do not necessarily mean he lacked the capacity to execute a deed. Ex parte Chris Langley Timber & Management, Inc. (Ala., No. 1031478, July 22, 2005.
Two days after being released from a long-term-care hospital to recover from heart surgery, Clayton M. Reynolds was evaluated by a clinical psychologist, who concluded that Mr. Reynolds was suffering from Alzheimer's disease. The psychologist administered a memory test that revealed that Mr. Reynolds could not retain new information for 30 minutes. Some months later, Mr. Reynolds contacted Chris Langley Timber & Management, Inc., about harvesting timber from land he owned. Mr. Reynolds provided Mr. Langley with copies a power of attorney held by one of his daughters and the psychologist's report, but assured Mr. Langley that he owned the timber and that he wanted to sell it.
After Mr. Reynolds executed the timber deeds, his two daughters sought to have them set aside on the ground that he lacked capacity. Mr. Reynolds died while the case was pending and a special administrator for his estate was substituted. Finding that Mr. Reynolds was mentally incompetent when he executed the deeds, the trial court entered a summary judgment in favor of the estate and set aside the deeds. The Court of Civil Appeals affirmed and Langley appealed.
The Supreme Court of Alabama reverses and remands. "It is not clear how severe short-term memory loss, which is all that [the psychologist's] testimony appears to establish Reynolds suffered from," the court writes, "demonstrates that Reynolds was unable to 'understand in a reasonable manner the nature and effect of' executing the timber deeds." The court rules that the estate failed to prove that a diagnosis of Alzheimer's disease equals permanent insanity, and that therefore the appellate court erred in shifting to the timber company the burden of proof of Mr. Reynolds's capacity to execute the deeds.
Reversing lower courts, the Alabama Supreme Court rules that an elderly man's diagnosis of Alzheimer's disease and severe short-term memory loss do not necessarily mean he lacked the capacity to execute a deed. Ex parte Chris Langley Timber & Management, Inc. (Ala., No. 1031478, July 22, 2005.
Two days after being released from a long-term-care hospital to recover from heart surgery, Clayton M. Reynolds was evaluated by a clinical psychologist, who concluded that Mr. Reynolds was suffering from Alzheimer's disease. The psychologist administered a memory test that revealed that Mr. Reynolds could not retain new information for 30 minutes. Some months later, Mr. Reynolds contacted Chris Langley Timber & Management, Inc., about harvesting timber from land he owned. Mr. Reynolds provided Mr. Langley with copies a power of attorney held by one of his daughters and the psychologist's report, but assured Mr. Langley that he owned the timber and that he wanted to sell it.
After Mr. Reynolds executed the timber deeds, his two daughters sought to have them set aside on the ground that he lacked capacity. Mr. Reynolds died while the case was pending and a special administrator for his estate was substituted. Finding that Mr. Reynolds was mentally incompetent when he executed the deeds, the trial court entered a summary judgment in favor of the estate and set aside the deeds. The Court of Civil Appeals affirmed and Langley appealed.
The Supreme Court of Alabama reverses and remands. "It is not clear how severe short-term memory loss, which is all that [the psychologist's] testimony appears to establish Reynolds suffered from," the court writes, "demonstrates that Reynolds was unable to 'understand in a reasonable manner the nature and effect of' executing the timber deeds." The court rules that the estate failed to prove that a diagnosis of Alzheimer's disease equals permanent insanity, and that therefore the appellate court erred in shifting to the timber company the burden of proof of Mr. Reynolds's capacity to execute the deeds.
